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Congressional Dysfunction, Public Opinion, and the
Battle over the Keystone XL Pipeline
Evan C. Zoldan*
When President Obama vetoed the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval
Act in early 2015, he signaled the end of a political drama that pitted
Congress against the President, Democrats against Republicans, and
the promise of jobs against concern for the environment. Like most
drama in Washington, it burned bright and hot, but soon was overtaken
by other, suddenly more urgent, matters.
Although news coverage of the pipeline has waned, the Keystone XL
legislation represents the serious and enduring problem of
congressional dysfunction. Using the Keystone XL legislation as a
point of departure, this Article offers insights into the inner workings of
Congress, the role of deliberation in lawmaking, and the relationship
between public opinion and the legislative process.
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When the people become indifferent to the acts of their
representatives, they will have ceased to take much interest in
the preservation of their liberties.1
INTRODUCTION
From the perspective of partisan politics, the fight over the Keystone
XL Pipeline Approval Act was not unusual—the pipeline largely is
opposed by Democrats, who fear its environmental impact, and
supported by Republicans, who are optimistic about the pipeline’s jobproducing potential. But, if we focus on the policy implications of the
Keystone XL legislation, or the political points scored during the fight
over its enactment, we may fail to see its serious defects as a matter of
legislative process. Indeed, no matter what one thinks about the
Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act as a matter of policy or partisan
political wrangling, the legislation reflects serious indicia of
congressional dysfunction, including a lack of deliberation and a failure
to provide guidance to courts, private parties, and government agencies.
This Article considers the Keystone XL legislation and concludes
that it is a powerful but far from unique example of congressional
dysfunction. Part I demonstrates that Congress’s dysfunctionality is
normally equated with its failure to enact statutes. However, because
our constitutional system does not value all congressional action
equally, congressional action as well as inaction can be dysfunctional.
Through a close reading of constitutional text, doctrine, and history,
Part II confirms that a statute is dysfunctional if it fails to reflect
deliberation or fails to provide guidance. Part III evaluates the
Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act in light of the constitutional values

1. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 841
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
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of deliberation and guidance and concludes that this high-profile
legislation represents dysfunctional congressional action.
Although the President’s veto ended the saga of the Keystone XL
Pipeline for the time being, the lessons that the Keystone story teaches
about deliberation, guidance, and congressional dysfunction endure
beyond the end of this one particular political drama. Part IV evaluates
congressional dysfunction beyond Keystone and offers suggestions
about what we, the public, can do to improve the legislative process.
I. CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION IS NORMALLY EQUATED WITH
CONGRESSIONAL INACTION
Criticism of the government is nothing new and, in a healthy
democracy, not something to condemn.2 Nevertheless, attacks on
Congress as an institution have become increasingly frequent and
pointed. Americans do not just disapprove of Congress; they hate it.3
This dissatisfaction is focused largely on how “dysfunctional” Congress
has become;4 that is, Congress frequently is denounced for its inability
to enact legislation addressing the nation’s problems.5 And this
criticism of congressional inaction is not limited to public opinion. In
addition to the public at large, the media and scholars also have
criticized Congress for its failure to act. This universal condemnation
leaves the undeniable impression that Congress’s main failure, its main
dysfunction, is its failure to pass legislation.
Popular polls attest that the public is fed up with Congress. The last
two terms of Congress have seen its lowest approval ratings in decades.6
2. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The Supreme Court noted our
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” Id.
3. During the 113th Congress, public approval of Congress reached an all-time low of 15%.
Aaron Blake, How Much Do People Hate Congress? Let Us Count the Ways, WASH. POST (Aug.
4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/08/04/how-much-do-people-ha
te-congress-let-us-count-the-ways/; see also Congress and the Public, Congressional Job
Approval Ratings Trend 1974–Present, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-pub
lic.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (showing a steady decline in public approval of Congress
over last ten years).
4. Yasmin Dawood, Democratic Dysfunction and Constitutional Design, 94 B.U. L. REV. 913,
914 (2014).
5. Ruth Marcus, The Fallout of Congressional Dysfunction, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-the-fallout-of-congressional-dysfunction/
2014/01/17/52e97534-7fab-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html.
6. Rebecca Riffkin, 2014 U.S. Approval of Congress Remains Near All-Time Low, GALLUP
(Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/180113/2014-approval-congress-remains-near-timelow.aspx; see also Congressional Favorability, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/
data-trend/political-attitudes/congressional-favorability/ (last updated Mar. 29, 2015).
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Exit polls after the 2014 midterm elections indicated that nearly 80% of
the public was angry over the way Congress does its job.7 Surveys
further confirm that this dissatisfaction was linked to Congress’s failure
to enact laws. A recent Gallup poll confirmed that “Americans’ high
level of disapproval is less about what Congress is doing than about
what it isn’t doing: putting aside partisan bickering and getting things
done.”8 In fact, nearly 60% of Americans who disapprove of Congress
do so because of their perception that Congress, rather than
accomplishing anything, spends its time engaged in political spats.9
Popular criticism of Congress for its failure to enact legislation is
reflected in, and fueled by, the popular media. Countless news
headlines in recent years have declared our national legislature another
“do-nothing Congress.”10 Many of these news reports explicitly
connected Congress’s low approval rating to the fact that it passes so

7. Jeremy Diamond, Exit Polls: Majority of Voters Dissatisfied or Angry with Washington,
CNN (Nov. 4, 2014, 6:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/04/politics/midterm-exit-polls-1/.
8. Lydia Saad, Gridlock is Top Reason Americans Are Critical of Congress, GALLUP (June
12, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163031/gridlock-top-reason-americans-critical-congress.
aspx.
9. Id. The connection between public approval of Congress and its production of legislation is
not merely anecdotal; indeed, data show that public opinion of Congress tracks closely the
number of bills it enacts. Over the last twenty years, public opinion has fluctuated from a low of
less than 15% to a high of nearly 60%.
Congress and the Public, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). Over this
same period, the number of bills that Congress has enacted has ranged from a low of fewer than
300 bills per term to a high of more than 600 bills per term. Legislation of the U.S. Congress,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/legislation?q=%7B%22congress%22%3A%22114%
22%7D (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). From the mid-1990s until the beginning of the 2000s, there
was a steady increase in both public approval of Congress and the number it bills that it passed.
Starting in the early 2000s, both public approval and number of bills enacted began to trend
downward, reaching low points in 2013. In the last two years, there has been a slight increase in
both the number of bills passed and public approval. Perhaps most tellingly, the apex of public
approval for Congress followed immediately after Congress’s most productive term (56.2% in
2001) and the nadir of public approval followed Congress’s least productive term (14.2% in
2013). Congress and the Public, supra; Legislation of the U.S. Congress, supra. These data
suggest that the public pays attention to the number of bills that Congress enacts (perhaps by way
of media reports); it also suggests that public approval of Congress depends, at least in part, on
Congress’s production of statutes.
10. Ashley Alman, In a Do-Nothing Congress, These Members Did the Least, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 16, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/16/do-nothing-cong
ress_n_6488942.html; Lauren Fox, ‘Do-Nothing’ Congress Was Way More Productive Than the
Current One, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 1, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.us
news.com/news/articles/2013/12/01/do-nothing-congress-was-way-more-productive-than-the-curr
ent-one; Cristina Marcos, A ‘Do-Nothing Congress’?, HILL (July 13, 2014, 10:30 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/212041-a-do-nothing-congress; Peter R. Orszag, A New DoNothing Congress, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 4, 2014, 9:03 AM), http://www.bloombergview
.com/articles/2014-11-04/a-new-do-nothing-congress. The original “do-nothing Congress” was
the 80th, so-labeled by President Truman in 1948.

ZOLDAN (617–645).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Congressional Dysfunction

12/9/15 9:30 PM

621

few laws.11 Scholars, too, have lamented congressional inaction.12
Some have linked Congress’s inaction with the government’s recent
near default on its debt obligations.13 While acknowledging that
legislative quantity is not equal to quality, Professor Zasloff echoed the
popular sentiment that “the middle of the deepest economic crisis since
the Great Depression . . . does not seem to be the time for inaction.”14
Similarly, Professor Beerman aptly described gridlock in the Capitol as
“worse than on the streets of midtown Manhattan during rush hour.”15
Professor Teter has raised the interesting possibility of judicial review
of arbitrary legislative inaction. Recognizing that public contempt for
Congress stems from its failure to act, Teter argues that Congress’s
inaction often stems from the arbitrary obstructionism of a single
member rather than from a principled policy objection.16
To be sure, Congress’s failure to act has foisted significant costs,
financial and otherwise, on the country. Take, for example, the 2013
shutdown of the federal government—a wasteful, embarrassing, and
dangerous civics lesson about the consequences of congressional
inaction. Aside from the estimated $2–6 billion in direct financial
losses, the shutdown forced the government to delay key functions, such
as reviewing and approving medical devices, issuing export and import
licenses, and executing federal loans.17 In addition to these economic
consequences, Congress’s inability to act has placed stress on other
parts of our delicately balanced constitutional system.18 For example,
presidential nominees to judicial and executive positions have
languished in a kind of legislative limbo, receiving neither Senate
confirmation nor rejection. As a result, key government positions have
been left unfilled.19 Moreover, President Obama has cited Congress’s

11. E.g., Alman, supra note 10; Marcos, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Dawood, supra note 4, at 928–29 (“[A] competitive party system can levy too
great a constraint on action.”); Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote: Judicial Review of
Legislative Inaction, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (2014) (noting that when Congress does not
act “important legislation languishes” and “critical policy matters go unaddressed”).
13. Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 481–82
(2012).
14. Id.
15. Jack M. Beermann, The New Constitution of the United States: Do We Need One and How
Would We Get One?, 94 B.U. L. REV. 711, 722 (2014).
16. Teter, supra note 12, at 1436.
17. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, IMPACTS AND COSTS OF THE OCTOBER 2013 FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 1–3 (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/rep
orts/impacts-and-costs-of-october-2013-federal-government-shutdown-report.pdf.
18. Dawood, supra note 4, at 917, 919.
19. The failure of the Senate to vote on presidential nominees has given rise to the increased
use of recess appointments, a practice invalidated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel
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choice “to do nothing” as the reason for his recent executive action on
immigration.20 This move has drawn a legal challenge that is already
winding its way through the federal court system.21
II. CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION INCLUDES SOME CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
For its recent brinksmanship over public debt and its repeated failures
to set policy, it is appropriate to fault Congress. And considering the
very real harm caused by congressional inaction, it is tempting, even
natural, to equate Congress’s dysfunction with its failure to pass laws as
the public, the media, and some scholars have done. Nevertheless, as
we grow anxious for Congress to do something, we should not make the
mistake of thinking that doing anything is better than doing nothing.
Indeed, congressional action can be as dysfunctional as inaction.
Among the most dysfunctional of laws are those that evince a lack of
deliberation or that fail to provide guidance.
A. Legislation Formed Without Deliberation is Dysfunctional
The Constitution demonstrates a strong commitment to legislative
deliberation. As the Supreme Court has held, the constitutional process
required before a bill becomes a law is designed to encourage
deliberation.22 Reflecting the view that deliberation will produce betterconsidered laws, the Court noted that the Constitution creates an
opportunity for “full study and debate” of the relevant issues.23 In
particular, the requirement of bicameralism, that each chamber of
Congress independently consider proposed legislation before it becomes
law,24 long has been justified as beneficial to deliberation. Perhaps the
best explanation of the connection between bicameralism and
deliberation comes by way of anecdote. Thomas Jefferson, who was in
France during the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, asked
George Washington to explain the merits of the Senate, a decision that
Jefferson believed required some explanation due to the body’s
distinctly undemocratic character. Washington responded with the
following analogy: “Why did you pour that coffee into your saucer?”

Canning. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014).
20. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Border Security and Immigration Reform, 2014
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (June 30, 2014).
21. Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015, revised Nov. 25, 2015),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 20, 2015) (No. 15-674).
22. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 959 (1983).
23. Id. at 951.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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“To cool it,” Jefferson replied. “Even so,” responded Washington, “we
pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.”25 This story,
though apocryphal, reflects the deeply held American belief that
legislation is best when it is the product of deliberation.
Consider also the Speech or Debate Clause, which protects
Representatives and Senators from being questioned outside the halls of
Congress for their legislative activities.26 The Court has read this
provision to facilitate free and open debate by members of Congress.
As the Court has held, the “heart” of the protections afforded by the
clause are the deliberative acts of speaking and debate.27 To this end,
the Court held that the clause grants broad immunity for legislative acts,
so long as they are an “integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes” by which members of Congress consider,
pass, or reject proposed legislation.28
In more subtle ways, too, the Constitution encourages deliberation.
The Journal Clause requires each chamber of Congress to “keep a
Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same.”29
This clause long has been interpreted to encourage deliberation by
ensuring that legislative decisions are not made in secret.30 As
described by Joseph Story in his foundational Commentaries on the
Constitution, publication of legislative journals sheds light on the
activities of the people’s representatives. And when legislators know
that their constituents can learn what motivated their votes in Congress,
they are less likely to conspire and cut private deals, and more likely to
deliberate.31 This reading of the Journal Clause also reveals the
potential connection between deliberation in lawmaking and the quality
of the laws themselves. As Justice Story described, by requiring
deliberation, the people will ensure that the laws passed in their name
are not oppressive.32 It is only when “the people become indifferent to
the acts of their representatives, [that] they will have ceased to take
much interest in the preservation of their liberties.”33
25. SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 4 (1997).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
27. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
28. Id.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
30. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670–71 (1892); STORY, supra note 1,
§§ 839–41; Nash E. Long, The “Constitutional Remand”: Judicial Review of Constitutionally
Dubious Statutes, 14 J.L. & POL. 667, 678 (1998).
31. STORY, supra note 1, §§ 840–41.
32. See id. § 840.
33. Id. § 841.
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The Constitution’s emphasis on deliberation reflects the historical
experiences of the generation that framed it. James Wilson, among the
most well-respected members of the Philadelphia Convention, and
undoubtedly the most learned in the history and theory of government,34
emphasized the centrality of deliberation in legislative work.35
Legislation following deliberation was apt to be thoughtful and
reasoned; by contrast, legislation enacted out of anger by lawmakers
responding to a particular, rousing event often resulted in legislative
“despotism, injustice, and cruelty.”36 Reflecting the national mood of
the period leading up to the framing of the Constitution, the influential
Vermont Council of Censors strongly condemned the legislature’s
“fickleness” and “want of deliberation in passing laws.”37
Importantly, the Court’s emphasis on deliberation is broader than the
contours of the bicameralism, speech or debate, and journal
requirements. Indeed, even when there is no question that these bare
constitutional requirements have been met, the Court has emphasized
the value of deliberation. In King v. Burwell, the Court’s recent
landmark opinion interpreting the Affordable Care Act, the Court
reiterated that it considered deliberation a primary responsibility of
Congress.38 In no uncertain terms, the Court criticized Congress for the
Act’s “inartful drafting,”39 attributing the ungainly language of the
statute to a lack of deliberation:
Congress wrote key parts of the Act behind closed doors, rather than
through “the traditional legislative process.” And Congress passed
much of the Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as
“reconciliation,” which limited opportunities for debate and
amendment, and bypassed the Senate’s normal 60-vote filibuster

34. William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
901, 1002–09 (2008).
35. See 1 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 294 (Kermit L. Hall &
Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
36. 2 id. at 867.
37. Address of the Council of Censors (Feb. 14, 1786), in RECORDS OF THE COUNCIL OF
CENSORS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 68 (Paul S. Gillies & D. Gregory Sanford eds., 1991)
[hereinafter VERMONT REPORT]. Legislation lacking in deliberation was not limited to the
framing period and neither was criticism of legislation enacted without appropriate deliberation.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the sheer volume of special bills introduced made it
impossible for the legislators to learn the contents of the bills before enacting them. Indeed, the
disregard for deliberation in several states attracted the criticism that legislators “passed bills
about which they knew nothing” and without “having heard more than the title” of the proposed
legislation read. Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in the
Nineteenth-Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 272–73 (2004).
38. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015).
39. Id.
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requirement. As a result, the Act does not reflect the type of care and
deliberation that one might expect of such significant legislation.40

The Court’s opinion in King affirms that the bicameralism, speech or
debate, and journal requirements of the Constitution, however
important, do not represent the outer limits of the Constitution’s concern
for legislative deliberation. Rather, these clauses can be seen as part of
a broader commitment of the Constitution to a robust legislative process
designed to produce well-considered legislative language. Indeed, it is
unlikely that the Court was concerned that the policies underlying the
ACA were under-deliberated; in fact, the ACA “was the subject of more
than two years of intense study and deliberation.”41 Rather, the Court’s
statement is better read as a criticism of Congress’s lack of deliberation
about the choice of statutory language instead of a lack of deliberation
about the concepts this language embodied.42
Taken together, the Constitution’s processes that encourage members
of Congress to engage in deliberation before passing laws, and the
historical experience that gave rise to these processes, set a standard
against which we should judge the worth of acts of Congress. A
parsimonious reading of the Constitution’s requirements for valid
lawmaking—bicameralism and presentment—fails to capture the spirit
of the ideal legislative process. Rather, in light of our textual, doctrinal,
and historical commitments to deliberation, we should valorize
legislation that reflects debate and study in both chambers of Congress,
the cooling off demanded by presenting the same language to two
distinct bodies, and consideration of the language of the laws enacted.
Moreover, we should value legislation that reflects care in its
construction and gives the public the opportunity to understand the
process by which it was formulated. By contrast, we should disapprove
of legislation that is the product of thoughtless, perfunctory assent or
inflamed passions, or which appears to obfuscate its origins and
purpose.43 In short, while legislation that does not bear the hallmarks of
deliberation may be constitutional, it must also be considered
dysfunctional.
B. Legislation that Fails to Provide Guidance is Dysfunctional
In addition to deliberation, another key function of legislation is to
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. Abbe Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the
Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 99 (2015).
42. Id.
43. Zasloff, supra note 13, at 485 (noting that extreme partisanship has led to bills emerging
from committees without the legislators themselves knowing their contents).
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provide guidance to citizens and government actors. This principle is
woven throughout the Constitution’s text and is reflected in Supreme
Court doctrine, jurisprudence, and long-standing principles of statutory
interpretation. For example, the Ex Post Facto44 and Due Process45
clauses embody the concept that a person should not be held
accountable for conduct that he could not have known was wrong.
Interpreting the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court held that a
commitment to the rule of law depends on the premise that a person is
“free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct.”46 When a law is
vague rather than clear, it denies even the reasonably careful citizen the
opportunity to avoid behavior that is proscribed.47 Moreover, vague
legislative directives give administrative agencies and courts the ability
to resolve ambiguity in an ad hoc and subjective manner, encouraging
inconsistent application of the law.48 The Ex Post Facto Clause ensures
that a person is punished only for conduct that was proscribed at the
time it was committed.49 As Lon Fuller has said of retroactive
legislation, it is a “monstrosity”; it literally makes no sense to govern by
rules that have not yet come into effect.50
The Constitution’s strong preference for statutes that provide
guidance is reflected in constitutional history. In the decade before the
framing of the Constitution, one of the most common sources of citizen
discontent was the Confederation-era legislative habit of enacting laws
that failed to provide guidance to citizens. Again, the Vermont Council
of Censors summed up the national mood when excoriating its state’s
legislature for failing to pass laws that provided guidance: “[T]he
revised laws have been altered—re-altered—made better—made worse;
and kept in such a fluctuating position, that persons in civil commission
scarce know what is law, or how to regulate their conduct in the
determination of causes.”51 James Madison made much the same point.
He cautioned against equating representative government with wellwritten laws, denouncing as inequitable laws that are “so incoherent that
they cannot be understood” or that are “repealed or revised before they
are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108–09.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10.
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (1964).
VERMONT REPORT, supra note 37, at 68.

ZOLDAN (617–645).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Congressional Dysfunction

12/9/15 9:30 PM

627

knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow.”52
The strong constitutional preference for statutes that provide
guidance is also reflected in the way that the powers of the different
branches of government are organized. Under the nondelegation
doctrine, when Congress vests authority in the executive branch, it must
supply the executive with an “intelligible principle”53 to implement. In
the absence of congressional guidance in the form of rules to follow,
standards to apply, factors to consider, methods to employ, or goals to
meet, a congressional grant of authority is not permitted.54
Although the level of guidance demanded by the Constitution is not
onerous,55 nonconstitutional rules also reflect the principle that statutes
must provide guidance. Among the most elementary canons of
statutory construction is the principle that every word, clause, and
sentence of a statute should be interpreted to have meaning.56 An
interpretation must be rejected if it will render any part of a statute
“inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”57 This canon of
construction is more than simply a judicial shortcut or rule of thumb.
Rather, it implements the constitutional value of guidance by ensuring
that courts do not construe statutes in a way that leaves affected actors
unaware of how statutory language controls their conduct.
Together, these constitutional and interpretative principles suggest
that legislation is dysfunctional when it cannot be read in a way that
provides guidance. A statute fails to provide guidance when it does not
inform government agencies or private parties about what conduct is
permitted or proscribed. It fails to provide guidance when it unsettles
the standing law by filling it with incoherent exceptions. It fails to
provide guidance when it cannot be interpreted in a way that gives
meaning to all of its provisions. Legislation that fails to provide
guidance, like legislation that evinces a lack of deliberation, has little
value in our constitutional system.

52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 317 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books ed. 1992).
53. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
54. Id. at 374–75, 379.
55. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131–
33 (1980) (observing that the nondelegation doctrine never required “more detail than was
feasible”); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 462–63 (2001) (rejecting Due Process Clause and
Ex Post Facto Clause challenges to retroactive judicial abolition of common law rule).
56. 2 FRANK E. HORACK, JR., SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 4705 (3d ed. 1943).
57. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009).
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III. THE KEYSTONE XL LEGISLATION AND CONGRESSIONAL
DYSFUNCTION
For the public at large, anxious for a legislature that would act, the
114th Congress began auspiciously. In the first days of the 2015
session, members of Congress introduced scores of bills, some even
with bipartisan support, signaling that Congress was ready to overcome
the dysfunction of inaction. However, if we measure the value of
congressional action against the attributes of deliberation and guidance,
it is evident that some of the decisions made by Congress early in the
term must be considered dysfunctional. The Keystone XL Pipeline
Approval Act, one of the very first bills introduced in Congress, is a
prime example of congressional dysfunction due to the lack of
deliberation it reflects and guidance it provides.
A. Keystone XL Legislation
1. The Keystone XL Pipeline
The saga of the Keystone XL Pipeline began in 2008, when
TransCanada, a Canadian oil company, applied for a permit from the
United States to construct and operate a pipeline in order to import
crude oil across the Canadian border.58 Pursuant to the permitting
process for cross-border oil pipelines, the Secretary of State exercises
the President’s power to grant the type of permit sought by
TransCanada.59 As part of its review, the State Department is required
to consider the environmental impact of the proposed transaction as
delineated by the National Environmental Policy Act60 and the
Endangered Species Act.61 TransCanada’s application for a permit
immediately sparked a controversy in Congress and among the
American public. Proponents of the pipeline argued that it would create
jobs and energy independence; opponents questioned the economic
benefits and feared the environmental risk.62 Opinion in Congress fell
largely along party lines. While Republicans overwhelmingly favored
the pipeline, Democrats largely opposed it.
Because of these
disagreements and, in particular, because of concerns about

58. PAUL W. PARFOMAK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43787, KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE:
OVERVIEW AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2015).
59. Exec. Order No. 13337, 3 C.F.R. 13337 (2004).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532, 1536 (2012).
62. PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 58, at 10–12.
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environmental impacts in Nebraska, the permitting process initiated in
2008 terminated in the denial of TransCanada’s permit application.63
In 2012, TransCanada applied again for a permit, this time with a
modified route.64 With the application pending before the State
Department, members of Congress introduced a number of bills in 2013
and 2014 to bypass the permitting process and approve TransCanada’s
application directly.65 With a slim Democratic majority in the Senate,
however, all of these bills died at the end of the 113th Congress.66
2. The Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act of 2015
In the wake of a Republican sweep of both chambers of Congress in
the 2014 midterm elections, the resurrection of Keystone XL legislation
was high on the agenda. Soon after the 114th Congress was seated in
January 2015, new Keystone XL legislation was proposed. Within days
of the beginning of the new term, members in both the Senate67 and the
House68 introduced legislation to bypass the pending administrative
process. The House bill passed almost immediately;69 the Senate took
more time, passing a similar (though not identical) bill three weeks
later.70 The House ultimately passed the Senate’s version of the bill,
called the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act, making it the first major
piece of legislation passed by the 114th Congress.
The Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act provided that
TransCanada’s previously filed application to build the pipeline was
deemed “to fully satisfy” the requirements of “any . . . provision of law
that requires Federal agency consultation or review.”71 In particular, the
Keystone XL legislation created an end-run around the requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species
Act, effectively amending these statutes to the extent that they stood in
the way of the approval of TransCanada’s permit.72 The result of the
Keystone XL legislation was the creation of a special benefit for a
particular company by exempting TransCanada from generally
applicable laws, including environmental laws, to which any other
63. President Barack Obama, Statement on the Keystone XL Pipeline, 2012 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 18, 2012).
64. PARFOMAK ET AL., supra note 58, at 1.
65. Id. at 7–8.
66. Id. at 7.
67. Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act, S. 1, 114th Cong. (2015).
68. Keystone XL Pipeline Act, H.R. 3, 114th Cong. (2015).
69. 161 CONG. REC. H180–81 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2015).
70. 161 CONG. REC. S637–38 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2015).
71. S. 1 § 2(b) (2015).
72. Id.
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person or company is subject. While other companies engaged in crossborder pipeline projects are required to submit their applications for
administrative review, TransCanada’s application was insulated by the
legislation from the administrative process. In the case of TransCanada,
Congress, rather than the State Department, made the determination
without the factual predicate normally required under standing law.73
In addition to the main thrust of the Keystone XL legislation, the
statute included a number of other notable features. First, the legislation
contained two sections that described the “sense of the Senate” on
issues only marginally related to the pipeline. Section 5 of the bill
provided that “[i]t is the sense of the Senate that climate change is real
and not a hoax.”74 Section 6 provided that “[i]t is the sense of the
Senate” that the Congress should tax bitumen,75 a type of petroleum
product that the pipeline would carry. Second, Section 6 of the bill also
contained what can only be described as a strongly worded suggestion
to the House of Representatives. Section 6 provided that the House
“should consider and refer to the Senate a bill” to tax bitumen.76
The sense of the Senate provisions are remarkable because they
reflect the origin of the language that was enacted by both chambers of
Congress. Statutory language has to originate somewhere, of course;
and there is nothing unusual about statutory language originating in the
Senate. However, the sense of the Senate provisions were passed not
only by the Senate, but also by the House, as is required by the
bicameralism requirement of the Constitution.77 In other words, the
Keystone XL legislation contained provisions in which the House
purported to describe the belief of the other chamber of Congress.
The provision providing a strongly worded suggestion to the House is
remarkable for similar reasons. In Section 6, the whole Congress
(including the House) suggested that one chamber (again, the House)
send the Senate a bill taxing bitumen. The fact that it agreed to this

73. See, e.g., Evan C. Zoldan, Opinion, The Surprising Constitutional Defects in Keystone XL
Legislation, PLAIN DEALER (Feb. 13, 2015, 5:35 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/
index.ssf/2015/02/the_surprising_constitutional.html (noting that the Keystone XL bill deems
TransCanada’s application compliant with federal laws and regulations without any factual
predicate); see also Chris Mooney, Why you should be skeptical of Congress’s Keystone XL bill
even if you favor the pipeline, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/18/another-reason-to-be-outraged-over-congress-keystone-billit-gives-one-company-special-treatment/ (explaining that the bill takes the fact-finding process
away from the State Department).
74. S. 1 § 5 (2015).
75. Id. § 6.
76. Id. § 6.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.

ZOLDAN (617–645).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/9/15 9:30 PM

Congressional Dysfunction

631

language directing it to write new legislation conveys the distinct
impression that the House of Representatives was tagging along with
the Senate’s bill rather than exercising its own judgment about the
legislative language. Moreover, both the sense of the Senate language
and the strongly worded suggestion language are remarkable because
they do not create actual legal requirements. That is, although these
provisions were enacted like any other bill, they merely expressed the
opinion of Congress (or at least the Senate) on matters related to climate
change and taxes rather than providing binding rules of conduct.
As was widely anticipated, the President vetoed the Keystone XL
Pipeline Approval Act.78 In his statement returning the vetoed bill to
the Senate, the President gave two reasons for his decision. First, he
criticized the bill for attempting to “cut[] short thorough consideration”
of the issues being weighed by the State Department.79 Second, he
criticized the bill for conflicting with “established executive branch
procedures” and attempting to “circumvent longstanding and proven
processes” for permit approval.80 Although proponents of the bill
attempted to keep it alive, the Senate failed by a handful of votes to
override the President’s veto,81 effectively ending the Keystone XL
Pipeline saga for the term.
B. The Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act was Dysfunctional
Congressional Action
The Keystone XL legislation made for good political drama; it pitted
Congress against the President, Republicans against Democrats, and
jobs against the environment. But, like most drama in Washington, it
was quickly overtaken by other, suddenly more urgent, matters.82 And,
as a matter of energy policy, the failure of the Keystone XL legislation
will likely have no lasting effect. Indeed, the legislation, by design,
affected only a single company and did not purport to resolve the many
pressing issues related to the production, importation, and transportation
of oil. Nevertheless, despite the ephemeral nature of the Keystone XL
legislation, the lessons we can learn from the saga are actually quite

78. President Barack Obama, Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the
Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Feb. 24, 2015).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Coral Davenport, Senate Fails to Override Obama’s Keystone Pipeline Veto, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/senate-fails-to-override-obamas-keystone
-pipeline-veto.html?_r=0.
82. Immigration issues, the confirmation of a new Attorney General, and the beginning of the
2016 presidential race occupied the political news throughout 2015.
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important. The Keystone XL legislation is a palpable example of
legislation that evinces a lack of deliberation and fails to provide
guidance. As a result, the Keystone XL legislation serves as a concrete
symbol of dysfunctional congressional action and offers a warning for
the future of the legislative process.
1. The Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act Evinced a Lack of
Deliberation
The Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act evinced a lack of
deliberation on the part of the House of Representatives. As noted
above, an essential part of our legislative process is the study and debate
of relevant issues. The process of bicameralism is intended to slow
down the legislative process in order to give each chamber of Congress
the opportunity, independently, to consider the text of proposed
legislation. Deliberation is not satisfied by mere perfunctory assent to
proposed language, but requires actual consideration of this language.
The public deliberation of proposed legislation is designed to reveal the
reasons why members voted for or against it.
Sections 5 and 6 of the Keystone XL legislation reflected a lack of
deliberation on the part of the House of Representatives. The “sense of
the Senate” language in these sections, which is perfectly reasonable
from the perspective of the Senate, makes little sense when emerging
from the House. What does it mean for the House to enact—into law,
no less—language that purports to express the sentiment of the other
chamber of Congress? To speak of the House explaining the
motivations of the Senate is, to repurpose the words of Lon Fuller, “to
talk in blank prose.”83 Similarly, the strongly worded language in
Section 6, which instructed the House to refer a tax bill to the Senate,
reflected the House’s lack of deliberation. What reason would the
House have to enact into law a reminder to itself to craft future
legislation? Of course, there is no reason at all. Rather, this provision
reflected a suggestion from the Senate, making the language
meaningless when enacted by the House.
With respect to both the sense of the Senate language and the
strongly worded suggestion to the House, it appears that the House
abdicated its responsibility to deliberate. By assenting to language that
is meaningless when coming from the House, the House appears to be
tagging along with the Senate’s deliberative process, acting as an agent
of the Senate rather than as a coequal chamber of the legislature. By
perfunctorily assenting to language that literally makes no sense when
83. FULLER, supra note 50, at 53.
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coming from the House, the House failed to take the opportunity to
study and debate—to deliberate—that is so valued by our constitutional
tradition.
The progression of the bill through the legislative process led even
some members of Congress to conclude that it lacked deliberation. A
number of members objected to the fact that the bill was submitted
directly to the House floor for a vote;84 the once textbook, but no longer
standard,85 process would have included hearings held by the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Of course, the failure
to assign bills to committee for vetting ceased to be novel some time
ago.86 As Professor Barbara Sinclair has described, the “textbook” path
of a bill to enactment has largely been supplanted by “unorthodox”
lawmaking.87 But, whether the process by which the Keystone XL
legislation reached the floor of Congress was unusual, or whether it
represents a commonplace new orthopraxy, the point remains the same:
cutting out the committee process limited opportunities for the
refinement and crafting of the bill’s language.88 Others objected that
cutting the executive branch out of the process prevented the “thorough
consideration of complex issues” that implicate the national interest.89
Still other members argued that the bill failed to reflect deliberation
because it was directed at a single company rather than designed to
address important and neglected issues of energy policy.90
Finally, the fact that the House failed to exercise deliberation in the
way contemplated by the Constitution is even more striking in light of
the fact that the Keystone XL legislation actually cut off the deliberative
84. See 161 CONG. REC. H954 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2015) (statement of Rep. Rush) (indicating
that the bill did not go “through regular order and the committee process”); 161 CONG. REC.
H172 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2015) (statement of Rep. Defazio) (explaining that none of the hearings
took place in the Transportation Committee).
85. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 14–17, 34–36 (1997).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4–5, 72–74.
88. The Court, too, has expressed concern about the connection between nonstandard
legislative process and under-deliberated legislative language. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,
2492 (2015).
89. 161 CONG. REC. H174 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2015) (statement of Rep. Pallone); see also 161
CONG. REC. S521 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2015) (statement of Sen. Cantwell) (noting that if Congress,
rather than the administration, approves the pipeline, Americans will lose protections attached to
the national interest determination); 161 CONG. REC. H175 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2015) (statement of
Rep. Rush) (explaining that seizing power from the president will prevent thorough consideration
of complex issues).
90. See 161 CONG. REC. S620 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2015) (statement of Sen. Udall) (“This bill
lacks a comprehensive energy policy.”); 161 CONG. REC. S137 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2015)
(statement of Sen. Schatz) (asserting that the bill is about a “specific pipeline” rather than national
energy policy).
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process that might have taken place at the administrative level. As the
President characterized the legislation when he vetoed it, by attempting
to remove the permitting decision from the State Department, the
Keystone XL legislation “cuts short thorough consideration” of
important policy issues.91 Perhaps the State Department was actually
engaging in deliberation; perhaps it was merely stalling to avoid making
a politically contentious decision. Either way, however, the Keystone
XL legislation ensured that any deliberation that might have taken place
at the administrative level would be extinguished. Because this
administrative deliberation was not replaced by deliberation at the
legislative level, the Keystone XL legislation represented not just an
absence of deliberation, but an affirmative rejection of deliberation.
2. The Keystone XL Legislation Failed to Provide Guidance
The Keystone XL legislation failed to provide guidance both to
government actors and private parties by enacting inoperative language
and by singling out a particular company for special treatment. First,
the legislation failed to provide guidance by including a substantial
amount of language that appeared to do precisely nothing. Sections 5
and 6 expressed the “sense of the Senate” that “climate change is real
and not a hoax” and that the House should pass a bill taxing bitumen.
Neither of these sections of the statute had any legally operative effect.
As courts have held, “sense of Congress” language is merely precatory
and does not obligate courts, agencies, or private parties.92 If the “sense
of Congress” creates no binding obligations, a fortiori, neither can the
sense of just one chamber of Congress. And, indeed, how could a court
give meaning to this “sense of the Senate” language? Would Section 5,
declaring that climate change is not a hoax, authorize the Environmental
Protection Agency to take additional action on climate change? Does it
perhaps invalidate a state law banning its government officials from
using the phrases “climate change” or “global warming”?93 Does
Section 6, which instructed the House to draft a bill to tax bitumen,
foreclose a court or administrative agency from interpreting current law
91. President Barack Obama, Veto Message to the Senate, supra note 78
92. Yang v. Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 183 F.3d 953, 958–59 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
“sense of Congress” language in a bill is precatory only and creates no binding obligations);
Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 995 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Brooks v.
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 107, 108 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that “sense of
Congress” statutory language is “plainly precatory”)).
93. Terrance McCoy, Fla. Scientist Told to Remove Words ‘Climate Change’ from Study on
Climate Change, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/03/10/why-this-florida-scientist-had-to-remove-the-term-climate-change-from-herstudy/.

ZOLDAN (617–645).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Congressional Dysfunction

12/9/15 9:30 PM

635

to permit the taxation of bitumen? If these readings are far-fetched,
such a result highlights the lack of guidance provided by Sections 5 and
6. These sections force courts into an impossible choice: they must
either ignore one of the oldest canons of statutory construction—to
avoid rendering statutory language inoperative—or they must stretch the
language of these merely hortatory remarks to find meaning. Either
way, these provisions fail to provide guidance, both to courts and to
government agencies.
Second, the Keystone XL legislation failed to provide guidance
because it singled out an individual company for special treatment. As
members of Congress opposing the bill noted, rather than providing
general rules of conduct for all applicants for federal permits or setting
energy policy generally, the bill provided a special exemption for a
particular corporation.94 By singling out a particular company,
TransCanada, to receive a special exemption from the normal
permitting process, the Keystone XL legislation offered no guidance to
private parties about how to approach the regulatory approval process in
the future. Companies seeking government approval for any sort of
regulated activity may be encouraged by the example of the Keystone
XL legislation to forego the normal administrative processes altogether.
Rather than spending the time and resources normally required to
navigate the administrative process under standing law, they may
instead find it more expedient to lobby Congress for a special
exemption from the law.95
The Keystone XL legislation also failed to provide guidance to
government agencies because, by singling out a particular company, it
failed to announce any national policy.96 One way to read the Keystone
XL legislation is as an approval of the policy to import foreign oil. Or,
the legislation could be read as a rejection of oil from outside North
America. Or, it could be read merely as a transfer of wealth to
TransCanada. Each of these inferences is permissible because, by
singling out TransCanada, Congress did not indicate what policy it was

94. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. S225 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 2015) (statement of Sen. Udall) (noting
that the bill concerns “one private-sector energy project”); 161 CONG. REC. S137 (daily ed. Jan.
12, 2015) (statement of Sen. Schatz) (noting that the legislation concerns only “a specific
pipeline”); 161 CONG. REC. H171 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2015) (statement of Rep. Grijalva) (calling
the bill “an earmark for a Canadian corporation”); 161 CONG. REC. H174 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2015)
(statement of Rep. Pallone) (referring to the bill as “special treatment” for a single company).
95. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. S144 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2015) (statement of Sen. Cantwell)
(noting that the bill sets the precedent that applicants can bypass the administrative process by
appealing to Congress directly).
96. 161 CONG. REC. S313 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Cantwell).
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trying to advance.97
C. Are Deliberation and Guidance Too Much to Ask from Congress?
Even if one accepts deliberation and guidance as constitutional ideals
for legislative action, one may object that demanding these from
Congress is unrealistically onerous. Any additional requirements placed
on Congress to encourage deliberation and guidance may further
impede what little it accomplishes. Moreover, it is hard to reconcile the
values of deliberation and guidance with Congress’s current practices;
for example, the House and Senate often use “sense” language
indicating their impressions or intentions.98 The force of these
objections is mitigated, however, once we distinguish between different
types of congressional action: although legislation should be held to the
constitutional ideals of deliberation and guidance described above, the
other activities of Congress need not conform to these ideals.
Therefore, even if we demand deliberation and guidance from
legislation, Congress’s other activities will not be constrained by these
demands; and the values of deliberation and guidance will not impede
Congress’s performance of its nonlegislative activities.
The Constitution distinguishes between Congress’s legislative and
nonlegislative activities. As the Supreme Court has described, the
Constitution vests the “legislative powers” of the United States in
Congress as a collective body rather than in either chamber alone.99
Only when acting as this collective entity is Congress exercising the
legislative powers of the United States—to wit—the enactment of
legislation.100 For this reason, it is only when Congress engages in “an
exercise of legislative power” that it is bound by the Constitution’s
bicameralism and presentment requirements.101 By contrast, the
Constitution provides that either chamber may express its sense or
97. Keystone’s specificity creates a problem that is the mirror image of the problem presented
by an overly broad delegation of authority. Just as a delegation without parameters fails to state
legislative policy because it provides no firm idea of what Congress was trying to accomplish, a
statute that applies to a single person fails to establish legislative policy because it provides no
generally applicable rule for courts or agencies to apply by analogy or precedent in the future. A
statute that applies to a single individual is, in Blackstone’s words, a “transient, sudden order”
rather than a law. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 43–44
(1872). This dichotomy suggests that there is an appropriate level of legislative generality
required before a statute properly may be considered “law.”
98. E.g., S. Res. 156, 114th Cong. (2015) (indicating the “sense of the Senate”).
99. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160–61 (1927); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
100. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 160–61; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
101. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–58 (1983) (explaining that Congress is required to
meet the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I when it is engaging in “an
exercise of legislative power”).
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impressions by passing a resolution rather than a law.102 To take one
recent example, the Senate expressed its impression about the
importance of childhood stroke awareness by passing a “resolution
expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to childhood stroke and
recognizing May 2015 as ‘National Pediatric Stroke Awareness
Month’.”103
Comparing legislation with nonlegislative action reveals the reason
for the Constitution’s fundamental distinction between these types of
activities. Legislation sets out “rules for the government of society.”104
It creates rights and obligations, which a person ignores at his peril.
Because of the weighty consequences of legislation, the Constitution
sets out procedures for its creation that encourage deliberation before it
is enacted. Similarly, because of the consequences that legislation
carries, the Constitution discourages legislation that fails to provide
guidance.
By contrast, resolutions do not necessarily represent the exercise of
legislative power. They do not normally set out the rules that govern
society or create any rights or obligations. Resolutions do, however,
provide Congress with a low-cost way to make its impressions or
intentions known.105 Like other nonlegislative acts, resolutions can be
used by legislators to signal their commitments to constituents and
colleagues.106 Resolutions serve an important function precisely
because they are not laws and do not create binding obligations.107
Consider the Senate’s resolution recognizing National Pediatric Stroke
Awareness Month. The resolution signals the Senate’s awareness of an
issue that it believes is of national importance. Nevertheless, it creates
no obligations, binds neither agencies nor private parties, and commits
no resources; a person may ignore the sense of the Senate without risk.
For these reasons, it makes sense to distinguish between legislation
and nonlegislative activities for the purposes of deliberation and
guidance. While it is appropriate for Congress to express its intentions
or impressions through a resolution without displaying deliberation or
providing guidance, more is required when Congress enacts legislation.
In the case of Sections 5 and 6 of the Keystone Pipeline legislation,
Congress blurred the line between these two types of congressional
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
103. S. Res. 156 (2015).
104. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810).
105. Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense of Legislative History, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1267, 1283 (2005).
106. Id.
107. SINCLAIR, supra note 85, at 10 n.5.
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activities. It would have been unobjectionable for Congress, or either
chamber, to pass similar language in the form of a resolution that, by
definition, creates no binding obligations. But, by enacting language in
the form of legislation, which is supposed to set out rules for the
governance of society, Congress was required to provide deliberation
and guidance. In answer to the objection posed above, deliberation and
guidance may be too much to ask from every activity of Congress, but it
is the bare minimum we should expect from acts of Congress.
IV. THE FUTURE OF CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION
The Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act did not become law. And
with the changing exigencies of political life in Washington, it may
never become law. But, concern about congressional dysfunction
directs us to look beyond this single political fight for more generally
applicable lessons. Indeed, the Keystone XL legislation is not the
first—and will not be the last—example of dysfunctional legislation. In
nearly every term, Congress enacts legislation that can be considered
dysfunctional. In 2014, to take just one recent example, Congress
transferred a large sum of money to a named individual to whom the
federal government owed no financial obligation.108
Moreover,
Congress routinely gives preferential tax treatment to specific
corporations,109 transfers public wealth to named individuals,110 and
grants exemptions to specific individuals from generally applicable
statutes and regulations.111 Like the Keystone XL legislation, these
laws are susceptible to the charge that they are dysfunctional because
they were enacted without due deliberation and because they fail to
provide guidance. This problem of dysfunctional legislation is well
known; scholars and jurists have long attempted to formulate ways to
curtail it, including proposing internal institutional reform.112 After
108. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565
(2013).
109. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 80 (1991).
110. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, § 145 Priv. L. No. 107-2, 116 Stat. 3119 (2002);
Priv. L. No. 103-5, 108 Stat. 5064 (1994); Priv. L. No. 103-3, 108 Stat. 5062 (1994); see also R.
ERIC PETERSEN & JENNIFER E. MANNING, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO DIE IN OFFICE:
HISTORIC AND CURRENT PRACTICES 12–14 (2012).
111. Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010);
Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Terri’s Law, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15, 15
(2005).
112. As commentators have noted, Congress’s willingness to comply with its internal rules
designed to foster deliberation are uneven at best. See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as
Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 863 (2010); Victor Goldfeld, Legislative Due
Process and Simple Interest Group Politics: Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial
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evaluating the most significant suggestion to monitor legislative
dysfunction, judicial review of the legislative process, I will advance an
alternative approach that is based on the connection between public
opinion and congressional dysfunction described in Part I.
A. Judicial Review of Congressional Dysfunction
Scholars have long argued that the process by which a law is formed
is relevant to its constitutionality.113 Forty years ago, Professor Tribe
advocated that judicial review should focus not only on the substance of
a law, but also on the procedures that led to its creation. He described
the role of the Due Process Clause in guarding the validity of the
procedures of lawmaking as “structural due process.”114 Around the
same time, Professor Sandalow recognized that members of Congress
have neither the time nor the incentives to focus fully on the issues
before them.115 Because members of Congress simply have not thought
deeply about proposed legislation, much legislation does not reflect an
“authoritative statement of societal norms.”116 Although not all
legislation that lacks deliberation is unconstitutional, argued Sandalow,
courts have a role in monitoring legislation that impinges on
fundamental values to ensure that the legislation is the product of
“deliberate and broadly based political judgment.”117
The arguments of scholars like Tribe and Sandalow have not
prevailed in the federal courts;118 nevertheless, they have attracted the
approval of individual judges, perhaps most notably Justice Stevens. In
his famous dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick, Justice Stevens recognized
that “it is traditional for judges to accord the same presumption of
regularity to the legislative process no matter how obvious it may be
that a busy Congress has acted precipitately.”119 Despite this, he
opined, the character of Congress’s procedures should be “considered
relevant to the decision whether the legislative product has caused a

Review of Congressional Processes, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 367, 370 (2004).
113. See, e.g., Terrence Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162,
1188 (1977); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 269–
70 (1975); see also Hans Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 242–43
(1976). Contemporary scholars continue to articulate models of judicial review over the
legislative process, for example, see Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial
Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1937 (2011).
114. Tribe, supra note 106, at 269–70.
115. Sandalow, supra note 106, at 1188.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 113, at 1918–19.
119. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.”120
Tribe, Sandalow, and Justice Stevens all suggest that the courts have
a role in reviewing legislation for process failures. Given the
Constitution’s commitment to deliberation and guidance, and the fact
that the Court often is comfortable preserving substantive rights by
enforcing procedural rules,121 it seems natural to rely on courts to
evaluate the legislative process. Nevertheless, a judicial review model
of policing the legislative process is susceptible to a number of serious
criticisms, many of them familiar.122 As a practical matter, it may be
difficult for courts to distinguish between judicial review that protects
the integrity of the legislative process and one that substitutes judicial
judgment for legislative judgment on policy matters.123 Moreover, as a
theoretical matter, separation of powers considerations discourage
courts from taking too hard of a look at the legislative process for fear
of treading on the prerogative of a coequal branch of government.124
There are answers to these objections that make the judicial review
model of correcting dysfunctional legislation more palatable.
Nevertheless, these answers also reveal the limitation of judicial review
as a remedy for dysfunctional legislation. Proponents of structural due
process or related doctrines would mitigate the potential for judicial
overreaching by limiting the potential scope of judicial review of
legislative procedures. Sandalow suggested limiting judicial review to
legislation that impinges on fundamental values.125 Justice Stevens
suggested that judicial review of the legislative process should be
limited to legislative classifications that would receive strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.126
As these qualifications suggest, the judicial review model of policing
dysfunctional legislation, whatever its merits, cannot reach all statutes

120. Id. at 550.
121. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 445 (1966); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 85–86 (1971).
122. The scope of this Article precludes an in-depth discussion of the merits of judicial review
of the process of lawmaking. Many other scholars have written at length about this important and
controversial subject. For the purposes of this Article, I argue only that, whatever its merits, the
judicial review model of overseeing the legislative process does not address all legislative process
failures.
123. Goldfeld, supra note 112, at 375 (haunting any discussion of a novel basis of judicial
review for social or economic legislation is the ghost of Lochner).
124. Philip P. Frickey & Stevens S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L. J. 1707, 1750 (2002).
125. Sandalow, supra note 113, at 1188.
126. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550–51 (1980) (Stevens J., dissenting); see also
ELY, supra note 55, at 145–47.
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that evince a lack of deliberation and that fail to provide guidance.
Take the Keystone XL legislation as an example: for the reasons stated
above, this legislation represents congressional dysfunction.127
Nevertheless, it involves a grant of a benefit rather than the deprivation
of a right. Moreover, its subject matter is economic in nature and does
not impinge on fundamental values. Because legislation granting
economic benefits rather than burdening fundamental rights receives
only minimal scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,128 it is
unlikely that judicial review of the legislative process, as envisioned by
Tribe, Sandalow, and Justice Stevens, would prevent laws like the
Keystone XL legislation. Nor would the judicial review model address
the other examples of dysfunctional legislation noted above, like special
transfers of wealth and exemptions from the standing laws, many of
which grant economic benefits and none of which relate to fundamental
rights or suspect classes.129 As a result, although there is an important
role for judicial review of the legislative process to ensure some
minimal level of deliberation and guidance, it is not sufficient to address
all types of dysfunctional legislation.
B. Public Opinion and Congressional Dysfunction
Because a judicial review-oriented approach to reducing
dysfunctional legislation leaves some significant gaps in coverage, it is
appropriate to look for ways to supplement it. An approach is suggested
by Part I, which describes the connection between public dissatisfaction
with Congress and Congress’s failure to enact legislation. As noted,
Congress’s failure to pass laws is the main reason for the public’s
disapproval of that body.130 Americans want—perhaps reasonably—
Congress to “get[] things done.”131 Most Americans who disapprove of
Congress cite its failure to act as the reason for their dissatisfaction.132
If these sentiments encourage Congress to pass statutes like the
Keystone XL legislation, then we, the public, are at least partially to
blame for congressional dysfunction. The public’s disapproval of
congressional inaction is both underinclusive and overinclusive of the
problem of congressional dysfunction. Disapproval of congressional

127. See supra Part I.
128. Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs for the Port of New Orleans, 330 U.S. 552,
556–57 (1947).
129. For a theory of judicial review of special legislation, a typical type of dysfunctional
legislation, see Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (2014).
130. See supra Part I.
131. Saad, supra note 8.
132. Id.
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inaction is underinclusive because both inaction (like Congress’s failure
to pass a budget) and action (like legislation that fails to reflect
deliberation or provide guidance) may be dysfunctional. Moreover,
disapproval of congressional inaction is overinclusive because it
disapproves of Congress’s unwillingness to pass dysfunctional
legislation as well as its unwillingness to pass legislation that provides
guidance and reflects deliberation.
As a result, the public’s
dissatisfaction with Congress’s failure to act is too blunt an instrument
to address the problem of dysfunctional legislation: sometimes it will
provide Congress the right incentives, but other times it will provide the
wrong ones.
The public’s dissatisfaction with Congress would be more effective
if, rather than reflecting congressional inaction generally, it was targeted
both toward congressional inaction and congressional action that
reflects indicia of dysfunction. That is, rather than merely criticizing
Congress for failing to pass statutes, the public should indicate, through
polls, elections, lobbying, contributions, and otherwise, that it values
statutes that reflect deliberation and provide guidance.
The public is well positioned to monitor not only the outcomes of the
legislative process—that is, legislation—but also the legislative process
itself. As noted in Part II, the Constitution requires that the chambers of
Congress keep records of their proceedings.133 Pursuant to this
mandate, and supplementing it, each chamber of Congress keeps not
only records of votes, but also comprehensive, publicly available
records of the debates that accompany votes.134 Because Congress now
publishes “substantially verbatim transcripts of floor debate and
remarks,”135 the public is able to read the debate, or lack of debate, that
accompanies proposed legislation. Because these debates are available
on a daily basis, and available on the Internet,136 the public is able to
monitor debates as they occur. Access to congressional debate enables
the public to formulate opinions not merely on the substance of
legislation, but on the legislative process as well. It allows members of
the public to press their representatives not merely for particular
outcomes, but for a robust process of deliberation. The unprecedented
ability of the public to monitor the legislative process makes possible,
perhaps more realistically than ever before, the ideal envisioned by

133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
134. McGreal, supra note 105, at 1283.
135. Richard J. McKinney, An Overview of the Congressional Record and Predecessor
Publications, LAW LIBR. LIGHTS, Winter 2002, at 17–18.
136. CONGRESS.Gov, www.congress.gov (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
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Justice Story: that “the public mind” will be “enlightened by an
attentive examination of the public measures” and that the conduct of
every member of Congress will be open to scrutiny by a public jealous
of its liberties.137
A model of public oversight of the process of lawmaking is superior
in many ways to the judicial review model. First, because public
oversight comes from the public rather than the courts, it is not
susceptible to the charge that it is countermajoritarian. As a result, a
public oversight model can be more demanding of the legislative
process than a judicial review model, scrutinizing Congress even when
it does not burden fundamental rights and suspect classes.138
Second, the public oversight model can react to and influence
legislation before it is enacted. Therefore, public oversight during the
legislation formulation process allows process dysfunctions, like lack of
deliberation and unclear statutory language, to be corrected before
negotiation over final language is complete. It is relatively costless for
Congress to take another day to discuss an under-deliberated provision.
By contrast, judicial review must wait to interpret or invalidate
legislation until it has been enacted.139 Indeed, it can take years for
legislation to wind its way through the courts before being struck down
as unclear or lacking deliberation. In the interim, uncertainty about the
fate of the legislation can persist, delaying public compliance and
regulatory implementation. For these reasons, it is less costly for
process errors to be corrected by the political process, before statutes
are finalized, than through the judicial process.
Third, public oversight of the legislative process is superior to
judicial review because it sends incentives to the members of Congress
that actually have committed the process error. For example, if the
Congress that drafted the Keystone XL legislation had received word
from constituents that its language failed to provide guidance, the very
members who drafted and debated the bill would learn the value of
guidance to their constituents. By contrast, when a court interprets or
strikes down legislation, sometimes years after it is enacted, the
membership of Congress has changed or, at least, is far removed
temporally from the Congress that drafted the legislation. The Congress

137. STORY, supra note 1, § 840.
138. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550–51 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Sandalow, supra note 113, at 1188.
139. Indeed, constitutional and prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction, like
ripeness, Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998), limit the timeframe during which
courts can weigh in on the interpretation or validity of legislation.
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that is sitting when legislation is interpreted or invalidated is unlikely to
learn as much from judicial intervention as would a Congress that
received a rebuke from its constituents during the process of bill
formulation.
Moreover, while legislators are motivated by the opinions of their
constituents, scholars have long noted that, with rare but notable
exceptions, Congress pays little attention to the way that courts interpret
its statutes. For example, Congress routinely ignores judicial decisions
that reveal mistakes or ambiguities in the law.140 Moreover, as recent
scholarship has shown, drafters of federal legislation do not, during the
drafting process, take into account how courts will later interpret these
statutes.141 For all of these reasons, the public is well situated to
monitor Congress and express its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
robustness of the Congress’s lawmaking procedures. As a result, the
public possesses a powerful tool to help mitigate dysfunctional
legislation. Although the public rarely will agree on the substantive
outcome of the debates that take place in Congress, it should not be
controversial for the public to agree that it wants guidance and laws that
reflect Congress’s considered judgment. In light of the constitutional
values of deliberation and guidance, the public can, and I suggest
should, take a more active role in overseeing Congress’s lawmaking
process. At a minimum, we should indicate to Congress that we do not
want it merely to do something, but that we want it to debate and study;
that we want each chamber to reflect on the language it enacts; that we
want it to provide guidance to courts, to the public, and to
administrative agencies. These indicia of good legislative process are
all within the power of Congress; and they also will help align our laws
with the spirit of deliberation and guidance that our constitutional
system values.
CONCLUSION
The public can, and should, criticize Congress for failing to address
pressing issues of national scope. But, it is entitled by the Constitution
to demand more from Congress than mere action; rather, it is entitled to
congressional action that bears certain hallmarks of quality, including
deliberation and guidance. The public’s role in ensuring that Congress

140. Henry J. Friendly, Judges Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLO. L. REV.
787, 792–93 (1963).
141. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (2013).
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enacts high-quality legislation can be powerful. By conveying popular
approval of legislation that reflects deliberation and guidance, and its
disapproval of legislation without these attributes, the public can
encourage Congress to enact legislation that comports with important
constitutional values. And, although good legislative process is no
guarantee of high-quality legislation, it is a good start in that direction.

